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The financial market turmoil of 2007 and 2008 was the most severe recession seen after the 
Great Depression. The economic momentum, previous to the crisis, created a strong demand for 
AAA securities that was not available on single bond market. This motivated arrangers to issue 
high volumes of structured finance securities, collateralized by subprime Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities. Most of the AAA investors based their choices uniquely based on Credit 
Rating Agencies’ assessment that taken into account Probabilities of Default or Expected 
Losses but mispriced the Systematic Risk. This fact created arbitrage opportunities for Asset-
Backed Securities (ABS) and ABS Collateralized Debt Obligations (ABS CDO) arrangers. 
They exploited it by issuing securities with high levels of Systematic Risk. In this work I run 
ABS and ABS CDO simulations to exemplify how these instruments were structured to explore 
these features. To quantify the extent of the mispricing I compare a structured security with a 
single bond with the same rating. I use the results to exemplify the potential gains obtained by 
the arranger by taking advantage of the investor’s blindness concerning Systematic Risk. I also 
approach other Structured Finance risks as parameter sensitivity and biased asset pool 
parameters in rating models. 
 
Keywords: Subprime Crisis, Systematic Risk, Collateralized debt obligations (CDO), Arbitrage 
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“The crisis was the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or 
computer models gone haywire.” 
 
























The financial market turmoil of 2007 and 2008 was the most severe recession seen after the 
Great Depression. Several millions of dollars had to be written-down because of the credit 
defaults in the U.S. mortgage market, major bank stocks fell down to less than half of their 
prices, suddenly banks liquidity dried-up and bailouts came into scene.  
Although derivatives are not the direct cause of the crisis as debt levels have been building since 
the 1980’s, unregulated derivatives facilitated leverage and thus the potential for contagion to 
unrelated markets and the “real” economy. Complex OTC derivatives helped to increase the 
opaqueness of risk in the markets. In particular “securitized instruments like CDO are thought to 
be not only a driving force behind the housing market boom but also largely responsible for the 
damage to the banking sector” (Griffin and Tang, 2010).  
At the same time, important transformations occurred in the banking system. Traditionally 
banks adopted a “sell and hold” policy for their loans but in the beginning of this century, this 
approach has been widely substituted by a “sell, pool, tranche and resell via securitization” 
policy. By doing this, banks were arguing that the system was being more and more stable 
because the agents most prepared to take it carried the risk. To discharge the risk, banks created 
more and more structured products, among which were the Asset-Backed Securities (ABS). 
Besides the risk allocation motivation, there were clearly an arbitrage motivation, with the 
purpose of gaining from the difference between the assets and liabilities of the structures. The 
ABSs were sometimes repackaged to generate CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations) in order 
to potentiate even more arbitrage gains. 
The result of this growing activity was a significant contribution for the creation of what is 
known as “shadow banking system” with a size compared to the traditional system but with no 
capital requirements (or lender of last resort), which helped to feed the boom in housing prices.  
By 2006, the underlying collateral for many CDOs, subprime MBS, began to experience 
sharp increases in delinquencies and defaults. In the wake of sharp erosion in collateral 
performance, spreads began to widen markedly in both subprime MBS and CDOs and 
consequently the issuance of CDOs began to decline. By 2007, the issuance of CDOs 
backed by subprime MBS had ceased. See Figure 1 (List of Figures). 
The rating agencies have come under a huge condemnation since the subprime crisis started in 
July 2007, because of the rating they attributed to some structured finance products linked to the 
subprime real estate segment. It is a common place to consider that the agencies behaviour in 
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the process of ratings was both immoral
1
, because of the agency risk, and also negligent, as they 
were not aware of the risk and the dynamics of those products. More than a condemnation of 
rating agencies, it was created hysteria against the “demons” of quantitative finance in general 
and credit derivatives related with the subprime in particular. Public press and general public 
opinion makers were tough to the Wall Street barons and to the Math Finance “geeks”. 
Suddenly all real economy problems had a well-defined origin. But the structured finance 
industry didn’t really appear from one day to another. There was a long maturity process before 
achieving the complexity of instruments we’ve seen. Furthermore the arguments against any 
kind of the structured instruments weren’t based on solid arguments. This work aspires to be a 
contribution to a more serious and rigorous discussion.  
Firstly I present the literature over the matters related to the subprime crisis in a sequence that 
makes clear some motivations behind relevant “players”. In this review I start by introducing 
the ABS (Asset-Backed Securities) and Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) in 
general and Subprime RMBS in particular as the first layer securitization. Then I focus on ABS 
CDO, a second layer securitization. In this section, besides describing the structures and 
motivations behind ABS CDO, I also introduce a demand side factor that could be the origin 
and motivation for using Subprime RMBS as collateral. Afterwards I summarize the main risks 
concerning these complex structured finance securities with special focus on Credit Rating 
Agencies (CRA) and the mispricing of systematic risk. The mispricing of the systematic risk 
may be one of the causes to support the explosive growth of Arbitrage CDO in the years before 
the crisis. The theoretical section closes with an overview of credit structural models that will 
support the second section of this work. 
In the second section I describe the theoretical framework to create a simulation model based on 
VBA and MS Excel, capable of giving conditional and unconditional Probability of Default, 
Expected Loss and Implied Probability of Default. Furthermore by exploiting the solver add-in I 
also generate an implied correlation factor of a single-name instrument that matches a multi-
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 See, for example, “The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings”, Benmelech and Dlugosz (2008) 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) 
 
In 1970’s U.S. Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) sold the first mortgage-
backed securities. In 1980’s the so-called ABS market expanded through other assets as credit 
cards and car loans. There is a much diversified range of justifications attributed to 
securitization; among them we highlight the most quoted. 
 
A very short sample of the vast literature on the theoretical justifications of securitization are the 
works of Stulz and Johnson (1985), DeMarzo (2005), Parlour and Plantin (2008), and Brennan, 
Hein, and Poon (2009), just to quote few examples. 
Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) meticulously explain the MBS securitization process and its 
potential drawbacks.  
 





To understand the growth of subprime mortgages market we must recall that in the period 
before the crisis it was observable two different states of these factors according to Coleman, 
LaCour-Little, and Vandell, (2008). From 2001 to 2003 house prices were increasing and 
interest rates were decreasing preparing extraordinary benign conditions for home ownership. 
From late 2003 to 2006 house prices kept increasing but interest rates increased, too, thus 
reducing housing affordability. See Figures 3 and 4 (List of Figures). 
 
The U.S. governmental agencies, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae 
were mandated to purchase mortgage loans to local banks. The purchase of these loans was 
based on verification of eligibility criteria in terms of quality and size of the portfolio.  Loans 
were then repackaged and placed in the capital markets with U.S. government guarantee. 
 
The mortgage loans that by some reasons were not eligible could be maintained by local 
banks or be placed in the secondary market with “private-labels” by Wall Street banks. With the 
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mentioned reduction of affordability since 2003, there was a growing share of non-agency 
mortgages and MBS. 
 
From the total securitizations in 2007 (2Q), the agency mortgages represent about 66%, leaving 
the rest as non-agency mortgages. Within the category of non-agency are the jumbo prime, too 
large mortgages portfolios to be eligible for government programs (8%), the alternative-A or alt-
A mortgages, more risk layering than those of the standard governmental agencies (13%) and 





In the years before the crisis there was a significant increase in the issue of securitizations based 
on the subprime segment. Furthermore, it was observed, as for example in Ashcraft and 
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 Source: Inside MBS & ABS, LoanPerformance, and UBS. 
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ABS CDO is a re-securitization based on ABS. Sometimes these second securitizations can be 
called as outer CDO (in contrast with inner CDO, first securitization).For the purposes of this 
work, we will focus primarily on CDO based on subprime segment ABSs.  
In recent years, as a consequence of the crisis, an increasing number of authors focused on the 
structure of CDO. To quote some examples Longstaff and Rajan (2008), Benmelech and 
Dlugosz (2008), and Sanders (2009) present an overview of CDO structure. 
Basically three types of CDO structures can be considered. First, in a Cash-flow CDO, a SPV 
(Special Purpose Vehicle) invest in assets such as loans, mortgages or bonds and issues notes to 
investors. The proceeds gained from collateral pool are then distributed to investors according 
to the “waterfall” – pre-specified interest and principal payment scheme. Second, in a Synthetic 
CDO, the asset-side is composed by CDS (Credit Default Swaps) and earnings are therefore 
gained by selling protection. The premium is usually invested in risk-free securities and in case 
of default of one of the CDS underlings, the principal of the CDO is written down. Third, in a 
Market-value CDO, that are very similar to Cash-flow CDO, the collateral pool is marked-to-
market. 
In terms of motivations two main types of CDO must be considered. The Balance-sheet CDO is 
motivated by the desire to achieve relief from regulatory capital requirements. The Arbitrage 
CDO aims to generate spread between the asset pool and the funding of CDO. The excess 
spread is then paid to equity investors. 
As indicated in Figure 1, the vast majority of CDO issuance was driven by arbitrage 
motivations. For sure, the balance-sheet CDOs played an important role, but it is undeniable that 









Demand for AAA CDO Securities 
 
At the demand side of our discussion is important to address some issues that could complete 
the understanding of the process that ended with the subprime crisis. The question of who was 
buying the CDO tranches has to be seen by the perspective of two different generic types of 
investors. As Adelino (2009) shows, the investors in AAA tranches were less informed about 
the quality of the assets collateralizing their investments than the ones investing in tranches with 
higher risk. 
Investors in AAA tranches, less sensitive to collateral information, were those who demanded 
large amounts of securities. These investors were most of the types constrained by restrictions in 
terms of ratings, so in order to maximize their return given a specific rating; they could choose 
these structured investments. The fact that ratings for structured products and traditional bonds 
were based on similar scale is seen as a main reason to the creation of an illusion of 
comparability in terms of risk between them. Examples of these groups are conservatively 
managed institutions that require AAA securities to hedge funds.  
Generally risk-based capital requirements take credit rating as an input. Therefore, and since 
there is no regulatory distinction between single or structured instrument for capital requirement 
purposes, then there is a strong motivation to try to gain more yield maintaining the levels of 
capital.  
A second group invested in securities with lower ratings. They usually were very specialized in 
quantitative competencies, with much more sensitivity to the risk of the instruments, and usually 
had also more ambitious targets for rates of return. Recall that most of the issues had the 
arbitrage motivation and that the profile of this second group matches the one of the possible 
arbitrageurs. Indeed, they could take the chance of the high demand of the AAA rated securities 
to enhance their gains, as it will be illustrated in the practical example of this work. Examples of 
these groups are private equity funds or investment banks that are looking for high-yield returns.  
Plantin (2003) besides presenting a theoretical analysis of the rationale for tranching and 
securitization activities such as CDO, shows that they arise as a natural profit maximizing 
strategy of investment banks, and predicts that investors with increasing sophistication acquire 
tranches with decreasing seniority.  
It has to be highlighted that the arguments above raise some doubts about the motivation of 
some CDO arrangers that maintained the first piece of loss, the equity tranche, on their balance-
sheets, “just” to show their confidence on the collateral assets quality. Furthermore, the 
inclusions of the above mentioned subprime RMBS as collaterals of these structures reinforces 
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suspicious about the motivations. The subprime RMBS figured as an attractive alternative since 
it had high spreads that could be potentially used as a source of arbitrage. Also, it was seen as an 
investment able to yield diversification benefits. 
 
Use of RMBS as Collateral 
 
Hu (2007) provides some justifications for the use of RMBS as collateral on CDO issues.  
The first is the weak performance of the high yield CBO (Collateralized Bond Obligations) 
during the crisis of 2000-2001, that created a demand for alternative investments to include in 
the CDO pools.  See Figure 2. 
Second, the economic momentum, including low interest rates until 2003 and booming housing 
market since 2001 were a strong contribution for a massive collateral generation. Finally, the 
introduction of CDS on RMBS allowed more flexibility for collateral managers to access 
exposures that were previously unavailable in a cash only market. 
Note that at the time and given the circumstances, RMBS were seen as both performing and 
familiar to the asset managers. 
ABS CDO issuers managed to create instruments able to generate a higher weighted average of 
interest from the collateral pool than the weighted average of interest paid to the holders of the 
ABS CDO securities. The arbitrage CDO, created to take advantage of this mismatch, was the 
main type of CDO issued in the years before the crisis
3
.   
If there is an intention of benefiting from the spreads of the collateral then there is a natural 
motivation for the inclusion of low quality assets in the pool. The above mentioned RMBS 
originated from the subprime segment appeared as a natural candidate for the inclusion in the 
pools since its credit quality was low, generating therefore high yields compared with other 
assets.  
Another way of developing this kind of securities that allows gains from arbitrage is the 
inclusion of high systematic risk assets. Donhauser, Hamerle and Plank (2010) explain in some 
detail how to structure this type of securities to improve gains by exploiting the mispricing of 
systematic risk. Most of this mispricing shall have existed during the boom before the crisis. 
Below I retake this topic to show a practical example of why there was a mispricing and how 
the ABS CDO issuers exploited it. For now, I just note that most of the mispricing was induced 
                                                          
3
 Global CDO Market Issuance Data, SIFMA/Thomson Financial 
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by the rating agencies as I also argue below. The inclusion of MBS, including those from the 
subprime segment with a relatively high probability of default (low quality) and already 
diversified (in terms of idiosyncratic risks) fitted in perfection the features sought by 
arbitrageurs. 
The structure of CDO created from MBS is described for example in Gorton (2008). The author 
presents a perspective from the origination of the subprime mortgages to the ABS structure 
focusing also on the information complexity between the parties in these deals, the sensitivity of 
the chain created from subprime mortgages to housing prices, the risk propagation and how the 
ABX index aggregated and revealed crucial information.  
Several authors have been justifying the reduction in the spreads between MBS-yield and 
treasury bonds by the growing demand of MBS by CDO arrangers. Examples of literature on 
this issue are for example Brennan, Hein and Poon (2009) and Deng, Gabriel, and Sanders 
(2009). These latter also highlight that the beginning of the reduction of the referred spread has 
occurred simultaneously with the issue of the subprime mortgage CDO. 
The search for poor quality and high systematic risk assets by arbitrageurs created an incentive 
for the origination banks to lax the risk assessment of the clients, as long as their intention was 
to accommodate the demand for more MBS for them. The topic of the adverse selection 
associated to lending in subprime segment has been widely approached in the recent years by 
many authors.  A broad perspective of the variety of frictions involved in the crisis was given by 
Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008). An interesting perspective is also presented by Keys, 
Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2008), who conclude that securitization affects negatively the 
incentives for lenders to screen the quality of loans they originated. 
Mian and Sufi (2008) shows for example that the expansion in mortgage credit to subprime 
segment and its dissociation from income growth is closely correlated with the increase in 
securitization of subprime mortgages. They also note that the period between 2002 and 2005 is 
the only one in the last eighteen years when income and mortgage credit growth are negatively 
correlated. 
Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2009) noted that as the level of securitization increases, lenders have an 
incentive to originate loans that rate high based on characteristics that are reported to investors, 
even if other unreported variables imply a lower borrower quality. 
Sanders (2008) demonstrate the sudden increased delinquency of housing markets since 2005. 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) argue that subprime loan quality had been decreasing for six 
years before the crisis. 
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The Main Risks concerning Structured Finance 
 
The role of Credit Rating Agencies (CRA) through the crisis has been widely debated both in 
public opinion and in scientific literature. Examples in scientific literature are Bolton, Freixas 
and Shapiro (2009), Mason and Rosner (2007), and Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009a).  
CRA have become specialized over time in the risk assessment of singular investments 
(traditional corporate bonds), often using qualitative analysis in the course. They have never 
been called to assess structured instruments, involving the kind of mathematical complexities 
that cannot be qualitatively judged.   
The truth is that despite the vague warning of some supervisory authority as Alan Greenspan 
who warned in 2005 that investors “should not rely solely on rating-agency assessments of 
credit risk”, almost all parties involved seem to have been caught by surprise by the burst of the 
crisis. No one had realized the complexity and the danger behind the securities. 
Plank (2010) suggests that there were three major issues regarding the subprime crisis of 2007-
2008: (i) High systemic risk factor sensitivity of structured debt; (ii) High risk of model choice 
and parameter sensitivity; (iii) Systematically biased asset pool risk parameters in rating models. 
The first risk to be taken into account is that tranching process generates very sensible results 
given its outputs. Specifically PD, LGD and correlation as inputs can be chosen to match a wide 
range of Probabilities of default, Expected Losses or other risk measures for tranches. Indeed, 
this dependence and sensitivity ultimately makes the collateral assets less important. The 
tranching process and its risks are well described in Brennan, Hein, and Poon (2009). Other 
authors addressed this issue as Gibson (2004), Fender and Mitchell (2005), Coval, Jurek, and 
Stafford (2009b), Hull and White (2010), Tarashev (2010) and Heitfield (2009). 
 
Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009b) demonstrate that CDO valuation models hinged on a high 
degree of confidence in the parameter inputs, when a little change in the inputs parameters could 
lead to a big change in the losses. Besides Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009b), also Tarashev 
and Tarashev and Zhu (2007) and Heitfield (2008) studied this subject. The most quoted as 
having more influence in the final results is the correlation. Correlation assumptions are a 
critical component of the CDO rating analysis. Imperfect default correlation of assets is the 
main reason why a CDO can normally offer tranches with a wide range of risks grades, 
regardless of the credit quality of assets. Consequently it is no surprise that structured finance is 




More generally, the risk of underestimating parameters as the main risk drivers PD, LGD and 
correlation is called structuring risk in this context. Given the strong usage of models in 
structured finance it also has an overlap with model risk. As in Plank (2010), the structuring risk 
is highly dependent on systematic risk.   
 
Secondly, there are evidences that there existed a bias related to input parameters in the years 
before the crisis or not. Very often CRA were criticized of having underestimated the input 
parameters (PD, LGD and correlation) and overestimated the house price appreciation.  
 
To a relatively rigorous analysis, there must be a differentiation two basic approaches to the 
determination of the rating: “point-in-time” (PIT) approach and “through-the-cycle” (TTC) 
approach. 
A TTC rating is based on a stress quantile of an unconditional macro factor distribution: 
)(1 qM TTCq
  
A PIT rating is based on a stress quantile of a conditional factor distribution: 
)(. 1 qM PITq
   
The conditional factor distribution of PIT rating arises from a forecast of the future mean level 
of a risk driver M plus a forecast error.  
The intention behind TTC is to maintain rating transition rates as low as possible. Therefore, 
ratings are determined based on stress PD and LGD for both corporate bonds and structured 
finance securities. So for the subprime segment, conditional on using this approach, CRA 
should have used undemanding scenarios for the stress tests. 
By using the PIT approach another source of uncertainty arises: the accuracy of mean and error 
of the factor distribution. It is a common place to point weaknesses of CRA as that they were 
using used too short time series, ignoring some risks intrinsic to the subprime segment  and also 
underestimated systemic risks. Also, the overestimation of house prices increase was almost 
taken as granted. If any of the weaknesses take place, then there we have a biased rating 




All these issues are related with the information deficits along the securitization value chain 
(Mason, 2008) or with the information that hard facts about borrower creditworthiness lost 
explanatory power in the course of time (Rajan, Seru, and Vig, 2008). 
  
Finally, one of the frequent critics that I’ve already mentioned above, is the use of the same 
scale to rate both singular and structured investments, and the consequent illusion of 
comparability.  From the asset pricing theory
4
, an asset price in a risk-neutral world is given by  
  
    
  
          
where p is the asset price, E(x) is the expected value of the asset x, Rf is the risk-free rate and 
cov(x,m) is the covariance between the asset x return and the stochastic discount factor m. 
As in Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2009a), an asset whose payoff covariates positively with the 
discount factor have its price raised, so that securities that fail to deliver their expected 
payments in the worst economic states will have low values, because these are precisely the 
states where the money is most valuable (high marginal utility).  
Asset prices should, therefore, reflect the premium for the covariation of its payoffs with priced 
states of nature. If the assessment of a security is just based on its ratings, and this rating is a 
function of an unconditional PD, then securities with same ratings would trade at different 
prices. In order to maximize the return, market arbitrageurs have a motivation to sell digital call 
options on market because these are the cheapest to supply bonds for a given rating. The digital 
call option on the market has the largest covariation possible with the market, so if the seller of 
the call “hides” the second part of the pricing equation then he can sell it receiving more than 
the fair amount. This is indeed considered as an optimal mechanism to exploit naïve investors 
that base their decisions solely on securities credit ratings. 
Note also that in terms of asset pricing theory, the idiosyncratic risks, uncorrelated with the 
discount factor, generates no premium. This is well discussed in Cochrane (2001) for example. 
The diversification effect results in the reduction of the idiosyncratic risk and consequently on 
the larger share of the systematic risk. Different products with identical exposure to systematic 
risk must have the same price, because the idiosyncratic risk can be eliminated through 
diversification. This is a fundamental insight from the CAPM model. 




Many authors have been calling attention that by Modigliani and Miller (1958) these gains 
should not exist, which leads us to consider the complex structure of these instruments in more 
depth. Three reasons to justify these gains are transaction costs, market incompleteness and 
asymmetric information (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2008). 
The question is that if CRAs were also fooled or they were informed about the riskiness of 
Structured Finance products? As it was already shown by Gibson (2004) for example, the 
mezzanine tranches, typically rated investment-grade, carries risk that can be many times that of 
an investment-grade corporate bond. Furthermore, the paper shows how the dependence of 
CDO tranches on default correlation can also be characterized and measured as an exposure to 






















Before proceeding to the empirical part of the work, I review some of the literature in the field 
of credit risk structural models, since it still lacks a theoretical framework on the modelling of 
individual credit risk.  A more analytical approach to modelling these risks will be presented 
below. 
Traditionally, the explanation of default processes relied on two main types of models: the 
structural and the reduced form. Reduced form models do not consider the relation between 
default and firm value in an explicit manner, since it uses market prices of instruments such as 
bonds or CDS to extract both their default probabilities and their credit risk dependencies, 
(Elizalde, 2005b). 
Concerning the structural models, modelling default and firm value in an explicit manner 
involves control when a firm’s assets are below a threshold – its debt. The first one attempting 
to do it was Merton (1974). In Merton Model it is of crucial importance the use of Black-
Scholes (1973) options pricing model in the valuation of corporate debts. 
Assumptions of the Merton Model are that the capital structure of the firm is composed by 
equity (E) and by a zero-coupon bond with maturity T and face value of D, whose values at time 
t are denoted by Et and z (t, T) respectively, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.  
Equity represents a call option on the firm’s assets with maturity T ( TV ) and strike price of its 
debt (D). The payoffs to equity holders and bondholders at time T under the assumptions of this 










The rest of assumptions Merton (1974) adopts are the inexistence of transaction costs, 
bankruptcy costs, taxes or problems with indivisibilities of assets; continuous time trading; 
unrestricted borrowing and lending at a constant interest rate r; no restrictions on the short 
selling of the assets; the value of the firm is invariant under changes in its capital structure 
(Modigliani-Miller Theorem) and that the firm’s asset value follows a diffusion process. For a 
more detailed explanation see Elizalde (2005b). There are several extensions to the model aimed 
to assume more realistic and relaxed assumptions, but never discarding the easiness of use. 
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A second approached was introduced by Black and Cox (1976). The main difference in 
comparison with the previous model was that default could occur at any time. This paper was 
the first of the First-passage models (FPM). Geske (1977, 1979) extends the model to consider 
characteristics such as sinking funds, safety covenants, debt subordination, and payout 
restrictions. These two along with Leland (1994;1998) and Leland-Toft (1996) contributed to 
extensions introducing endogenous default boundary. 
Stochastic interest rates allow the introduction of correlation between the firm’s asset value and 
the short rate, and have been considered, among others, by Ronn and Verma (1986), Kim, 
Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Nielsen et al. (1993), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Hsu, 
Saá-Requejo and Santa-Clara (2004), Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993). 
Inclusion of jumps had contributions of Zhou (2001a) and Huang and Huang (2003). 
In addiction there are new models that are trying to be more consistent with empirical data as 
Liquidation Process Models (LPM) and State Dependent Models (SDM).  SDM assumes that 
some of the parameters governing the firm’s ability to generate cash flows or its funding costs 
are state dependent, where states can represent the business cycle or the firm’s rating. This 
branch of structural models is able to reduce the problems of predictability of defaults and 
recovery suffered by standard models because the firm is subject to exogenous changes of 
parameters which are the main drivers of default probabilities. Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec 
(2004) and Elizalde (2005b) present two different models illustrating the previous ideas.  Like 
LPM, State Dependent Models (SDM) have only been developed theoretically and their future 
success in credit risk modelling (if any) lies in their empirical applicability and their ability to 












3. Empirical Analysis 
 
As already mentioned previously, potential arbitrage gains should be created by mispricing 
systematic risk contained in SF securities. To illustrate this effect of mispricing I setup a model 
based on Merton model and on Vasicek assumptions to demonstrate the sensitivity of SF 
securities to systematic risk. The resulting implied correlation can then be used to evaluate 
prices of created tranches. The setup phase intended to be as simple as possible, but without 
relaxing the theoretical accuracy. Whenever possible it is used some data from Standard & 
Poor’s to calibrate the model giving some real world flavour to the simulations conducted. 
Recall that the arbitrage opportunities illustrated in this section had a crucial importance in the 





I start this section by making a basic distinction between the asset and the liability side of the 
CDO structure. Randomness typically occurs at the asset side of the structure. Consequently, it 
is assigned a probability space  PF,, to this side representing the probabilistic mechanism 
steering all random effects including payment defaults and prepayments. The liability side of 
the structure consists of tranched securities and is linked to the asset side by a random variable 
or vector translating asset scenarios into liability scenarios, hereby inducing a probability space
),,( 
X
PE  .  
  ),,(,, 
XX
PEPF   
Any CDO can be modelled by the following: 
Step 1: Monte Carlo simulation of the underlying reference portfolio at the asset side of the 
transaction. In our particular case at this side we will start with 100 bonds. 
The mathematical part of this first step in the model is the construction of the probability 
space  PF,, . 
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Step 2: Modelling of the random vector

X  that translates asset scenarios into liability side 
scenarios. The mathematical result of this is the 

X -induced probability space ),,( 
X
PE  . 
For instance, this part includes cash flow waterfall modelling. 
Step 3: Evaluation of simulation results, e.g., hitting probabilities and expected losses for 
tranches, distributions of the internal rate of return for tranches, expected interest and 
principal streams, risk adjusted duration of tranches, and so on. 
 
In this work I use some MS Excel functions along with VBA to setup the simulations exercises. 
These instruments guarantee some advantages as they are very easy to implement, nevertheless 
also holds some drawbacks as the lack of efficiency. For this particular thesis it fits very well 
since these instruments are just demonstrative of the concepts behind it.  
In terms of CDO modelling there are analytic, semi-analytic, and comonotonic simulation 
techniques. These techniques can speed-up CDO evaluations. In comparison with other credit 
baskets modelling, with CDO one typically has to spend much time in cash flow modelling in 
the liabilities side. Monte Carlo simulation is the preferred tool for CDO evaluation due to its 
intrinsic scenario orientation. 
The basic inputs in the Monte Carlo approach includes the individual credit spread or default 
probability for each asset and the correlation matrix of the portfolio. Leaving aside the 
problematic interpretation of the second input (asset, equity or spread correlation as a proxy for 
the “desired” default correlation matrix), the basic Monte Carlo setting suffers from two main 
drawbacks. First, for an accurate estimate of spreads, this technique requires a large number of 
simulations. Given the large size of a typical underlying portfolio (usually over 100 credits) this 
procedure can, therefore, be excessively time consuming. Secondly, there is an issue with the 




A common trick to reduce the number of estimates is to introduce “factors” that can capture and 
describe the dependency structure among credits. Thus, instead of analyzing the dependency of 
each pair of credits, factor models replace this credit-vs.-credit approach with a credit-vs.-





Valuation of Single Name Securities 
 
Starting by definition of the value of a single firm, we assume that it follows a Geometric 
Brownian motion. The respective dynamics is given by: 
titiitiiti dWVdtVdV ,,,,  
 
Where tiV ,  is the single-name security value, i is its drift and i its diffusion. dW represents 
the dynamics of a Geometric Brownian motion.
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0 tiiiit WtvV    
So at maturity we have 
 TiiiiiTi WTVV ,20,, ).2/(exp    
 
 
                                                          
5
 See Bjork (2010), for example. 
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Log-return is normally distributed and can be extracted from: 
TiiiiiTiti WTTVVLnS ,
2
0,,, ).2/()/(    
As I mentioned before we simplify the dependence structure by replacing credit-vs.-credit 
approach with a credit-vs.-common factors. Therefore I split the expression between market 
(systematic) and idiosyncratic factor: 
TiiuTmiTii UMW ,,,    
This gives us: 
TiiuTmiiiti UTMTTS ,,
2
, ).2/(    
 
Following the logic of structural models, firm defaults when it falls below a certain threshold. 
The objective
6
























































This is called the standardized default threshold. The abovementioned probability is exactly the 







                                                          
6
 The difference between Objective and Risk-neutral probability will be made clear below. 
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By Vasicek, the correlation coefficient tji ,, between each pair of random variables, like rates of 
return Ri and Rj in a portfolio setting, is the same for any two firms: 
ttjitjti RRCorr   ,,,, ),(
 
For any ji   
And since this is true we can write random variables as a function of a common random source: 
TiiTiti UMR ,, 1    
We arrived at a well-known one-factor model. Here we can make clear that the value of a firm 
is driven by a systematic part (market factor M), interpreted as an indicator of the general state 
of the business cycle (e.g., some stock, bond index or GDP) and the idiosyncratic factor (firm 
specific, U) which is the indicator of events strictly linked to the credit itself. The market factor 
M is a common source of uncertainty. Both M and U are assumed to be (standard) normally 
distributed and independent.  





cUM    
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Risk-neutral Valuation of Systematic Risk 
 
The pricing of financial instruments is based on the risk-neutral probabilities (Q), instead of 
being based on the objective probability (P). In general, the price of a financial derivative 
instrument is the present value of the expected cash flows under the risk-neutral measure Q. By 
Vasicek Model, it is assumed market completeness and the absence of arbitrage opportunities 
(Bjork, 2010). 
For the purposes of this work it is used the class of equivalent probability measures Q called 
martingales, where non-dividend paying asset processes are discounted using a default-free 
short rate (r). Absence of arbitrage is a necessary requirement for the existence of one 
equivalent probability measure (at least), and the assumption of market completeness guarantees 
its uniqueness. Such an equivalent measure is called a risk neutral measure and will be used to 
derive bond pricing formulas. In this line of thought it is assumed the independence of the 
firms’ credit risk and the default-free interest rates under the risk neutral probability measure. 

























Note that the logic is almost the same as presented earlier when calculating the objective default 
probability. The issue here is that instead of having
ii
 , there is a r  as drift of our firm value 
because it is assumed risk-neutral world (no-arbitrage). This allows to isolate
P




































Denoting the Sharpe-ratio by   and adding the relationship )( rr miii    we can 
conclude that the difference between objective and risk neutral default probability represents a 



























Conditional Valuation on Market Factor 
 
For the purposes of this work the systematic risk represented by the market factor is a key 
variable. Therefore I show some manipulations of the default probability to find the conditional 







































This is the individual default probability of each firm defaulting at time t, and it is known from 
Vasicek.  We can obtain the default threshold by computing )( ,
1
, TiTi
P pc  , since it is 
considered that the default probability is given externally by rating agencies. This conditional 
probability on a market realization will be very useful to obtain the Expected Loss-profile of a 
security (Expected Loss given a determined market realization).  
It is an assumption of the Vasicek model that this default probability is the same for each of the 
securities in the portfolio. It is also assumed that the number of securities in the portfolio is very 
large. Furthermore the size of each credit in the portfolio is similar. 
The Recovery Rate (RR) is the percentage of a credit exposure that is recovered in case of a 
default event. Therefore the Loss Given Default (LGD) is obviously given by 1-RR. By Vasicek 




Risk Measures for CDO Tranches 
 
Hitting probability measures the probability of a tranche being hit, independently of the width of 
the loss.  
))(( aTLPp trT   
 
 Standard and Poor’s and Fitch determine ratings based on this measure. 
Another risk measure for CDO is the Expected Loss. This, differently from the previous 

























Moody’s uses this measure.  
 
Loan equivalent “Bond Representation” 
 
In order to quantify the systematic risk in the tranches we can follow different approaches 
presented in recent literature.  
A first approach is used by Donhauser, Hamerle and Plank (2010), that presents the virtual asset 
correlation (as a quantification of systematic risk) using the methodology followed also by 
Hamerle, Jobst, and Schropp (2008). 
Another possible approach is the one used by Yahalom, Levy, and Kaplin (2008). These authors 
provide an overview of how to calibrate loan-equivalent correlation parameters. They assume 
two identical CDO tranches with collateral pools containing different assets with the same 
characteristics concerning number and risks. Both are driven by a single factor model with 
identical risk parameters. They can then obtain the virtual asset correlation by using the formula 
sim
A JPDPDPDJPD ),,( 2,121   
 




I followed Hamerle, Jobst, and Schropp (2008) to find the 
tr

 (virtual asset correlation) 
implicit in a virtual CDO tranche, so that it has the same Hitting Probability profile that was 
found in a specific simulation run. This simulation was conducted to result in a HP-profile for 
each tranche. 
A CDO tranche is approximated by a single-tranche bond in a single factor model with 
probability of default
tr






as loss given default of the 
virtual bond. The approach ensures that the EL-profile of the single tranche bond resembles the 
simulated CDO tranche. 
This is achieved by finding a 
tr

such that  



























































































maxL is the maximum LGD for a tranche. a and b are the attachment and detachment points 
respectively. The approach used for the LGD, in the words of the authors, “aims to be as basic 
as possible and comparable to approaches that are used for modeling traditional single-name 


















Valuation of CDO Tranches 
 
The pricing of a defaultable bond ),0( TBd  can be priced with the following equations: 
    TQRRTQTBTBd   1.().,0(),0(  
  )..)((1 ,
1
























Sample Collateral Pool and Input Parameters  
 
Our base case portfolio will be composed by 100 equally weighted BB+ rating bonds with five 
years to maturity that is the average mortgage securities maturity. Each of our portfolio bonds 
has a default probability of 7.0% consistent with its rating.  
% Default Rate 
  From To 
BB+ 5.18 7.02 
 
The complete curve values for five year maturity is presented in annex I. 
We will also assume a deterministic recovery rate of 40% for the assets in the collateral pool. 
S&P was applying a 50% mean and a 20% standard deviation for secured US corporate bonds, 
and a 38% mean and a 20% standard deviation for unsecured US corporate. This work intends 
to be as simplistic as possible in terms of modelling the LGD parameter, but for reference I 
mention that almost all modelling of this parameter is done via a Beta Distribution with alpha 
parameter referring the mean and beta referring to the standard deviation. 
It is also assumed that %10  for all bonds in the portfolio.  S&P applied a correlation 
parameter according with the table below: 
Table 3.1: Correlations assumptions of S&P 
    Between Sectors Within Sectors 
    Corp ABS Corp ABS 
Within Country   5% 10% 15% 30% 





   Global     15%   





   Global     15%   
 
 
In order to give a real world flavour to the work I’m going to base the CDO liability side on 
“Octagon Investment Partners V”. The structure is divided into five tranches with different 










Equity 0.0% 7.8% 
Junior 7.8% 9.3% 
Mezzanine 9.3% 14.3% 
Senior 14.3% 21.3% 
Super-Senior 21.3% 100.0% 
































 with 1.000.000 trials, we got the results for unconditional Probability of 
Default and unconditional Expected Loss. Based on the table in annex I it was assigned a rating 
to each tranche of the liabilities side of the structure. The exception is the equity tranche that 
usually is not rated. 
 







PD EL Rating S&P 
Equity 0,0% 7,8% 96,99% 49,82% - 
Junior 7,8% 9,3% 10,83% 9,18% BB- 
Mezzanine 9,3% 14,3% 6,92% 3,04% BB+ 
Senior 14,3% 21,3% 1,02% 0,30% BBB+ 
Super-Senior 21,3% 100,0% 0,04% 0,00% AAA 
Pool 0,0% 100,0% 96,99% 4,20% BB+(*) 
 
Note that the collateral pool is composed by BB+ bonds and that 90.7% of the tranches are at 
least BB+.  
 
Expected Loss Profile 
 
I now analyse the expected tranche loss conditional on market factor realization by applying the 




















By doing so, the intention is to call the attention to the risk profile of a portfolio of defaultable 
securities in terms of systematic risk in opposition to a single-name security.   
                                                          
7
 See annex III for VBA code used 
(*)Average of collateral pool 
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Comparing the EL-profile, obtained via simulation, of a BB+ CDO Tranche (Mezzanine) and a 
BB+ bond we have a clear image of the differences between both.  
As seen in the Figure 5, same hitting probabilities (same ratings) don’t reflect the real EL of 
tranches, mainly in worst phases of the economic cycle, as already discussed in the theoretical 
framework. It is also true that a market factor of -4, when most of the tranche loss has already 
been materialized, is a very rare event as %0032.0)4(   but empirical evidence shows 
that these rare events occur to often against what is expected. So a potential danger resides in 
assuming these events probability based on normal distributions.  
We can try to demonstrate that creating an illusion of comparability between single and multi-
name securities can drive to a mispricing of risk creating arbitrage opportunities that explain the 
explosive growth of CDOs before 2007. So the next step will be to quantify this systematic risk 
of the tranches of our sample CDO by applying the “bond representation” methodology.  
 
Correlation of CDO Tranches 
 
The table below presents the results following the “bond representation” methodology. In 
practice I used “Solver add-in” of MS Excel to find the results. 
 
Table 3.4: Asset Correlation and Minimum Squared Root Error results 




Equity 96.99% 49.82% 0.3924 0.000352 
Junior 10.83% 9.18% 0.8142 0.000001 
Mezzanine 6.92% 3.04% 0.7914 0.000002 
Senior 1.02% 0.30% 0.8023 0.000001 
Super-Senior 0.04% 0.00% 0.4167 0.003058 
Pool 96.99% 4.20% 0.1000 0.000000 
 
 
As seen in the figure 6, the adjustment we made following the adopted methodology has a very 
good fit in terms of Expected Loss-profile (or implied hitting probability). This is a perfectly 
consistent conclusion with the MSE value.  
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The better approximation of the mezzanine and junior tranches is generally due to the lack of 
flexibility of the Gaussian copula model. Because of their position at the ends of the capital 
structure the equity as well as the senior tranche profile does not fulfil the symmetry criterion 
that is fulfilled by the middle tranches. Therefore, the goodness of fit of these tranches is less 
satisfactory.  
Hull and White (2004) show that any zero mean unit variance distributions can be chosen for 
market and idiosyncratic factors. They find that the “double t” copula model where both have t-
distributions with 4 degrees of freedom (scaled so that the variance is one) fits market data on 
synthetic CDOs well. It has considerably more tail default correlation (i.e., it has a higher 
probability of extreme clustering of defaults) than the Gaussian copula model. 
The graphs from the other four tranches are presented in the annex II.  
 
Valuation of CDO tranches 
 
The valuation table of CDO tranches are presented below. 
 
Table 3.5: CDO tranches pricing parameters and prices by “Bond Representation” 
Tranche IPD Corr (p) LGD Tranche Price 
Equity 49.82% 0.3924 100.0% 23.67 
Junior 9.18% 0.8142 100.0% 57.27 
Mezzanine 3.04% 0.7914 100.0% 70.39 
Senior 0.30% 0.8023 100.0% 79.74 
Super-Senior 0.00% 0.4167 49.2% 81.86 
Pool 7.00% 0.1000 60.0% 76.15 
 
These are considered as “fair” arbitrage-free prices. The argument for the explosive growth of 
CDOs has been the mispricing of the systematic risk so I compare the results above with a 
valuation that assumes a correlation of 0.1.  Furthermore as the arbitrageurs’ earnings are 
residual I calculate the price of the equity tranche (retained by those arbitrageurs) as the 
difference between the collateral pool price and the weighted average of all the other tranches 





Table 3.6: CDO tranches pricing parameters and prices assuming 10% sensitivity to the market 
factor 
Tranche IPD Corr (p) LGD Tranche Price 
Equity 49.82% 0.1000 100.0% 14.35 
Junior 9.18% 0.1000 100.0% 69.79 
Mezzanine 3.04% 0.1000 100.0% 77.31 
Senior 0.30% 0.1000 100.0% 81.31 
Super-Senior 0.00% 0.1000 49.2% 81.87 
Pool 7.00% 0.1000 60.0% 76.15 
 
Comparing the tables above the conclusion is that the arranger (the alleged arbitrageur) of CDO 
that retains the equity tranche can exploit the situation in his advantage by selling tranches of 
non-equity CDO tranches at prices assuming low correlation parameter. The non-equity 
tranches that the arranger usually does not maintain in his balance sheet has a “fair” value price 
below what is obtained assuming a market standard methodology of cash-flow waterfall.  
If the investors rely on ratings then there is a ground for mispricing and therefore to arbitrage. 
This can be an explanation to the explosion of arbitrage during 2006 and 2007, prior to the 
crisis. 
 
Table 3.7: Comparison between prices obtained by “Bond Representation” and assuming 10% 
sensitivity to common market factor 
Tranche Bond Representation Correlation=10% Difference 
Equity 23.67 14.35 9.32 
Junior 57.27 69.79 -12.53 
Mezzanine 70.39 77.31 -6.92 
Senior 79.74 81.31 -1.56 
Super-Senior 81.86 81.87 -0.01 
Pool 76.15 76.15 0.00 
 
CDO Squared: Second Layer Securitization 
 
As already mentioned, much of the CDO issuances were created with other Structured Finance 
securities as collateral (recall Figure II). This is, allegedly, a reason for the increasing systematic 
risk. Imagine, in a purely theoretical exercise, that I incorporate some of abovementioned BB+ 
tranches (Mezzanine tranches) in the structure presented earlier. The key point is that while 
PD’s are comparable (7% versus 6.92%) the systematic risk of the pool is increasing sharply 















Equity 0.0% 7.8% 35.58% 24.03% 0.9564 0.000074 
Junior 7.8% 9.3% 17.78% 16.87% 0.9904 0.000001 
Mezzanine 9.3% 14.3% 16.13% 14.66% 0.9909 0.000005 
Senior 14.3% 21.3% 13.15% 11.79% 0.9909 0.000002 
Super-Senior 21.3% 100.0% 10.44% 4.13% 0.8793 0.000069 
Pool 0.0% 100.0% 35.58% 6.94% 0.7907 0.000000 
 
As mentioned, this is a fully theoretical exercise to show how increasing systematically risky 
assets included in the pool contributed to an even increasing systematic risk. The result obtained 
allows the conclusion that the sensitivity of all tranches, except the super-senior, to the market 
factor is very close to 1, therefore being considered as catastrophe bonds, already referred 
previously as the cheapest-to-supply securities. This exercise lacks adherence to reality as the 
practice was to mix ABS tranches with other traditional bonds and to reset the attachment and 
detachment points in order to fulfil the market demand for AAA securities. That’s obviously 
impossible given the super-senior tranche PD obtained via simulation in this exercise. 
Nevertheless we can conclude from this section that the inclusion of high systematically risky 
assets increases drastically the sensitivity of tranches to market factor.  
 
ABS CDO Tranches Valuation 
 
To a better approximation to the instruments in the source of the crisis let’s take a look to ABS 
CDOs (also called Structured Finance CDO). Our intention will be to examine the arbitrage 
opportunities when selling ABS CDO tranches with subprime exposure – containing RMBS 
mezzanine tranches. The argument for a further increasing of the mispricing is the inclusion of 
already systematically risky collateral in the pool. Indeed, this was many times the case with the 
mortgages being of the same geography.  
Lets assume that instead of using a homogeneous collateral pool of BB+ assets, all with 
sensitivity of 0.10 to the market factor, it is used a pool composed by the following assets: 
  PD LGD #Securities   
BB+ Mezzanine Tranche 6.92% 100% 70 79.14% 




The parameters of the BB+ mezzanine tranches are based on the previous simulation, including 
the sensitivity parameter  . The new simulation intends to reflect the high systematic risk in the 
pool of assets. For the sake of comparability the attachment and detachment point are redefined 
in order to guarantee a rating based on PD for the mezzanine tranche to be same as of the inner 
CDO (BB+). 
The results of the simulation are in the following table. 
 
Table 3.9: Simulation results for an ABS CDO with 70 BB+ Mezzanine tranches and 30 BB+ 










Equity 0.0% 11.5% 80.47% 26.66% 0.8346 0.000870 
Junior 11.5% 31.0% 13.66% 9.24% 0.9752 0.000009 
Mezzanine 31.0% 66.0% 6.18% 3.34% 0.9500 0.000021 
Senior 66.0% 80.0% 1.13% 0.44% 0.7602 0.001797 
Super-Senior 80.0% 100.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.4512 0.002091 
Pool 0.0% 100.0% 80.47% 6.10% 0.6147 0.001591 
 
The asset correlation result shows that a further increase of sensitivity of the parameter is 
observed. Therefore, assuming again investors’ “blindness” to systematic risk, there will be 
further arbitrage gains as for the same rated tranches the “fair” value will be even lower.  
 
Table 3.10: Comparison between prices obtained assuming 10% sensitivity to common market 








Junior 69.79 57.27 54.94 
Mezzanine 77.31 70.39 68.10 
Senior 81.31 79.74 79.19 
Super-Senior 81.87 81.86 81.87 
 
Note that I didn’t structure the CDO in order to optimize the arbitrage gains. In other words, 
since there are asset correlation values lower than one, there is a further margin to the 




Other Sources of Increasing Systematic Risk 
 
The arbitrage gains can also be optimized by increasing the number of tranches or by 
introduction of thin tranches, also called trancheletes. From traditional portfolio theory it is 
known that pooling a large number of assets reduces the idiosyncratic loss variance but it is 
questionable whether this benefits the investor. Donhauser, Hamerle and Plank (2010) 
concludes that diversification in collateral pools of CDO tranches implies increasing 
concentration risk. The introduction of thin tranches was very popular prior to the crisis. It 
allowed, for example, the split between a senior and super-senior tranche, turning this last even 

























The economic momentum, previous to the crisis, created a strong demand for AAA securities 
that was not available on the single bond market. The arrangers had, therefore, a strong 
incentive to create new investment products to fulfil these requirements. In order to exploit the 
market conditions and the focus of investors on ratings as the unique way to assess the riskiness 
of the instruments, arrangers were encouraged to create products with high levels of systematic 
risk. A natural candidate figuring as collateral was the subprime RMBSs because they were 
already systematically risky given its default rates and concentration in some specific 
geographical areas. These encourage further the generation of more subprime RMBSs with a 
decreasing quality of the underlyings. The abovementioned blindness of investors regarding  the 
state of the economy in which the default could occur or, in other words, their blindness to the 
systematic risk was exploited by arrangers to generate arbitrage gains. These gains could be 
potentiated by the arrangers by keeping the first piece of loss, the equity tranche, as growing 
systematic risk tends to underestimate the value of these tranches (and overvalue the non-equity 
tranches). With the 2008 meltdown, the investors of highly rated SF securities stopped buying 
as there was a large downgrade of these product’s ratings. They also understood that risk drivers 
of SF securities were systematically biased against them. 
The biased risk drivers included high risk of model choice and parameter sensitivity, 
systematically biased asset pool risk parameters in rating models and high systemic risk factor 
sensitivity of structured debt. The first one can be fixed by adopting a Bayesian perspective, 
explicitly acknowledging the parameters uncertainty. With respect to the biased pool 
parameters, one can only conclude that there is a need for stronger estimation methodologies. 
The main focus of this work was to explore the high systemic risk factor sensitivity of 
structured debt. So I applied  the “bond representation” methodology to compare these debt 
products with traditional single-name products with the same rating. I performed three 
simulations: (i) A CDO backed by single bonds; (ii) A CDO backed by Mezzanine tranches and 
(iii) A CDO backed by single bonds and Mezzanine tranches. The finding that all tranches had a 
higher level of sensitivity to the market factor is the key point. The potential mispricing led to 
huge opportunities in generation of arbitrage gains and fed the subprime standards laxing that 
turned to be the cause of these products downgrades and losses. 
The motivation of keeping the first piece of loss to show confidence collateral quality is 
strongly doubtful as also are the blindness of both rating agencies and supervisors.  
The long-term incentives underlying securitizations are still valid but the second layer 
securitizations must be very carefully approached in the future. So I believe that a more 
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transparent and standardized securitizations market will boost again the issuance in CDO 
market, but nothing compared to the level previously seen. In particular, the avoidance of high 
systematically risky exposures, second layer securitizations, thin tranches and very large 
collateral portfolios could help increasing investors’ confidence, as well as maintain 
“controllable” the model risk of these instruments.  
If CRAs uses TTC ratings, taking into account the systematic risk, then there is a potential to 
attract AAA investors again into the Structured Finance market. Most of the demand for these 
securities is driven by institutional investors, as pension funds, seeking for truly low risk 
products. The CRAs must guarantee that the stresses implied on ratings are rigorous enough to 
“cover” the worst phases of the economy. Moreover, it must also be taken into account 
empirical evidence that shows that extreme events tend to be  more frequent than the values 
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Figure 3: Monthly House Price Indexes for Census Divisions and U.S. 
 
 
Purchase-Only Index (Only Index available with Monthly Frequency) 
NSA=Not Seasonally Adjusted; SA=Seasonally Adjusted 
 





































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Expected Loss profiles of a single BB+ Bond and a Mezzanine tranche 
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Annex I: S&P Default Rates 
% Default Rate 
  From To 
AAA 0,000 0,061 
AA+ 0,061 0,098 
AA 0,098 0,219 
AA- 0,219 0,276 
A+ 0,276 0,371 
A 0,371 0,459 
A- 0,459 0,686 
BBB+ 0,686 1,391 
BBB 1,391 2,323 
BBB- 2,323 5,179 
BB+ 5,179 7,020 
BB 7,020 10,424 
BB- 10,424 14,595 
B+ 14,595 18,571 
B 18,571 24,463 
B- 24,463 34,333 
CCC+ 34,333 55,809 
CCC 55,809 70,042 
CCC- 70,042 85,513 
 
Source: Standard & Poor’s. CDO Evaluator Version 3.0: Technical Document. 
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Annex III: Simulation Codes 
Inconditional PD and EL Simulator Code 
Source: this function is based on Loeffler and Posch codes. Some changes to the basic version were 
implemented. 
Sub simCDO() 
'PD e EL incondicional para as tranches 
Dim M As Long, N As Long, K As Integer, i As Long, j As Long, a As Integer, y As Integer, auxRO 
As Double 
M = Range("c3")  'Number of simulations 
N = Application.Count(Range("B10:B65536"))   'Number of loans 
K = Application.Count(Range("G3:G65536"))   'Number of tranches 
Dim d(), LGD() As Double, EAD() As Double, w() As Double, w2() As Double 
Dim tranchePD() As Double, trancheEL() As Double, attach() As Double 
Dim poolPD As Double, poolEL As Double 
Dim factor As Double, loss_j As Double, sumEAD As Double 
ReDim d(1 To N), LGD(1 To N), EAD(1 To N), w(1 To N), w2(1 To N) 
ReDim tranchePD(1 To K), trancheEL(1 To K), attach(1 To K + 1) 
'Read in attachment points and sum of loan exposures 
For a = 1 To K 
    attach(a) = Range("G" & a + 2) 
Next a 
attach(K + 1) = 1 
sumEAD = Application.WorksheetFunction.Sum(Range("D3:D65536")) 
'Write loan characteristics into arrays 
For i = 1 To N 
    d(i) = Application.WorksheetFunction.NormSInv(Range("B" & i + 9)) 
    LGD(i) = Range("C" & i + 9) 
    EAD(i) = Range("D" & i + 9) / sumEAD 
    auxRO = Range("E" & i + 9) 
    w(i) = (auxRO) ^ 0.5 




'Conduct M Monte Carlo trials 
For j = 1 To M 
    factor = NRND() 
    'Compute portfolio loss for one trial 
    loss_j = 0 
    For y = 1 To 1 
        For i = 1 To N 
            If w(i) * factor + w2(i) * NRND() < d(i) Then 
                loss_j = loss_j + LGD(i) * EAD(i) 
            End If 
        Next i 
    Next y 
 'Record losses for tranches 
    a = 1 
    Do While loss_j - attach(a) > 10 ^ -15 
        tranchePD(a) = tranchePD(a) + 1 / M 
        trancheEL(a) = trancheEL(a) + Application.WorksheetFunction.Min _ 
                       ((loss_j - attach(a)) / (attach(a + 1) - attach(a)), 1) / M 
        a = a + 1 
    Loop    
    'Record losses for collateral pool 
    If loss_j - 0 > 10 ^ -15 Then 
        poolPD = poolPD + 1 / M 
        poolEL = poolEL + Application.WorksheetFunction.Min _ 
                       (loss_j, 1) / M 
    End If 
Next j 
Range("H3:H" & K + 2) = Application.WorksheetFunction.Transpose(tranchePD) 
Range("I3:i" & K + 2) = Application.WorksheetFunction.Transpose(trancheEL) 
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Range("H" & K + 3) = poolPD 
Range("I" & K + 3) = poolEL 




























Conditional  PD and EL Simulator Code 
Source: this code was also based on (...)  
 
Sub simulationCDO_M_Norm() 
'PD's, EL's e IPD's condicionais ao factor M 
Dim M As Long, N As Long, K As Integer, i As Long, j As Long, a As Integer, auxRO As Double 
Dim L As Long, x As Long, myRange As Range, Lmax As Double 
Dim poolEL As Double, poolPD As Double, poolLGD As Double, poolIPD As Double 
M = Range("c3")  'Number of simulations 
N = Application.Count(Range("B10:B65536"))   'Number of loans 
K = Application.Count(Range("G3:G65536"))   'Number of tranches 
L = Range("C4") 
Lmax = 0.6 
Dim d(), LGD() As Double, EAD() As Double, w() As Double, w2() As Double 
Dim tranchePD() As Double, trancheEL() As Double, attach() As Double 
Dim marketFact() As Double 
Dim trancheLGD() As Double 
Dim trancheIPD() As Double 
Dim factor As Double, loss_j As Double, sumEAD As Double 
ReDim d(1 To N), LGD(1 To N), EAD(1 To N), w(1 To N), w2(1 To N) 
ReDim tranchePD(1 To K), trancheEL(1 To K), attach(1 To K + 1) 
ReDim trancheLGD(1 To K) 
ReDim trancheIPD(1 To K) 
'Read in attachment points and sum of loan exposures 
For a = 1 To K 




attach(K + 1) = 1 
sumEAD = Application.WorksheetFunction.Sum(Range("D3:D65536")) 
'Write loan characteristics into arrays 
For i = 1 To N 
    d(i) = Application.WorksheetFunction.NormSInv(Range("B" & i + 9)) 
    LGD(i) = Range("C" & i + 9) 
    EAD(i) = Range("D" & i + 9) / sumEAD 
    auxRO = Range("E" & i + 9) 
    w(i) = (auxRO) ^ 0.5 
    w2(i) = (1 - auxRO) ^ 0.5 
Next i 
'Jumps to the output sheet 
Sheet4.Select 
For x = 1 To L 
factor = Cells(1, x + 1) 
'Conduct M Monte Carlo trials 
For j = 1 To M 
    'factor = NRND() 
    'Compute portfolio loss for one trial 
    loss_j = 0 
    For i = 1 To N 
        If w(i) * factor + w2(i) * NRND() < d(i) Then 
            loss_j = loss_j + LGD(i) * EAD(i) 
        End If 
    Next i  
    'Record losses for tranches 
    a = 1 
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    Do While loss_j - attach(a) > 10 ^ -15 
        tranchePD(a) = tranchePD(a) + 1 / M 
        trancheEL(a) = trancheEL(a) + Application.WorksheetFunction.Min _ 
                       ((loss_j - attach(a)) / (attach(a + 1) - attach(a)), 1) / M 
        trancheLGD(a) = (Application.WorksheetFunction.Min(Lmax, attach(a + 1)) - attach(a)) / 
(attach(a + 1) - attach(a)) 
        trancheIPD(a) = trancheEL(a) / trancheLGD(a) 
        a = a + 1 
    Loop 
    'Record losses for pool 
    If loss_j - 0 > 10 ^ -15 Then 
    poolPD = poolPD + 1 / M 
    poolEL = poolEL + Application.WorksheetFunction.Min _ 
                       (loss_j, 1) / M 
    poolLGD = Lmax 
    poolIPD = poolEL / poolLGD 
    End If  
Next j 
 
'Range("H3:H" & K + 2) = Application.WorksheetFunction.Transpose(tranchePD) 
Set myRange = Range(Cells(3, x + 1), Cells(3 + K - 1, x + 1)) 
myRange = Application.WorksheetFunction.Transpose(trancheEL) 
Cells(3 + K, x + 1) = poolEL 
Set myRange = Range(Cells(3 + K + 2, x + 1), Cells(3 + K + 2 + K - 1, x + 1)) 
myRange = Application.WorksheetFunction.Transpose(tranchePD) 
Cells(3 + K + 2 + K, x + 1) = poolPD 
Set myRange = Range(Cells(3 + 2 * (K + 2), x + 1), Cells(3 + 2 * (K + 2) + K - 1, x + 1)) 
myRange = Application.WorksheetFunction.Transpose(trancheIPD) 
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Cells(3 + 2 * (K + 2) + K, x + 1) = poolIPD 
Set myRange = Range(Cells(3 + 3 * (K + 2), x + 1), Cells(3 + 3 * (K + 2) + K - 1, x + 1)) 
myRange = Application.WorksheetFunction.Transpose(trancheLGD) 
Cells(3 + 3 * (K + 2) + K, x + 1) = poolLGD 
ReDim trancheEL(1 To K) 
ReDim tranchePD(1 To K) 
ReDim trancheLGD(1 To K) 
ReDim trancheIPD(1 To K) 
poolEL = 0 
poolPD = 0 
poolLGD = 0 
poolIPD = 0 
 
Next x 
 
End Sub 
 
